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What should an attorney do if she is faced with a client who insists
on perjuring himself? What if an attorney's client informs her that he is
planning on committing a violent crime? Petty theft? This Comment
deals with the question of when an attorney should and must reveal client
confidences to prevent or remedy fraudulent or criminal conduct. More
particularly, this Comment addresses how Washington's new Rules of
2Professional Conduct address these issues.
In 2003, the American Bar Association (ABA) promulgated
amended Model Rules of Professional Conduct (2003 Model Rules).3
Subsequently, Washington began re-evaluating its own Rules of Profes-
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I. State v. McDowell, 681 N.W.2d 500, 504-05 (Wis. 2004). Three days into a criminal trial,
defense counsel for Mr. McDowell expressed to the court his concerns that Mr. McDowell would
testify untruthfully. Id. at 500. The court advised defense counsel that he had two choices: (1) he
could recommend to his client that he not testify untruthfully; or (2) defense counsel could take the
middle ground by calling Mr. McDowell to testify in the narrative form. Id. The court advised de-
fense counsel that he did not have the option of withdrawing because the trial was already underway.
Id. Defense counsel conferred with his client and reported to the court that his client would be truth-
ful on the stand. Id. However, when Mr. McDowell took the stand his attorney did not use the tradi-
tional question and answer format. Id. at 506-07. Consequently, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held
that Mr. McDowell's attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel because defense counsel
may not substitute narrative questioning for the traditional question and answer format unless coun-
sel knows that the client intends to testify falsely. Id. at 504.
2. WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6, 3.3 (2006).
3. 2005 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY I (Thomas D. Morgan &
Ronald D. Rotunda eds., 2005).
Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 30:245
sional Conduct (1985 Washington RPC).4 The Washington State Bar As-
sociation (WSBA) Board of Governors appointed the Special Committee
for the Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct (Ethics 2003
Committee) to consider whether Washington should adopt the ABA's
2003 Model Rules of Professional Conduct.5 The Ethics 2003 Committee
ultimately recommended adopting the ABA's 2003 Model Rules with a
few changes ("proposed rules"); 6 consequently, by order dated July 10,
2006, the Washington Supreme Court adopted most of the ABA's 2003
Model Rules (2006 Washington RPC, or "adopted rules"), which became
effective September 1, 2006.7
Permissive and mandatory revelations of client confidences are
governed by two rules, 1.6 and 3.3.8 The Ethics 2003 Committee origi-
nally recommended adoption of Model Rule 3.3, Candor Toward the
Tribunal, verbatim,9 and adoption of Model Rule 1.6, Confidentiality of
4. See WASH. STATE BAR ASS'N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE FOR EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (ETHICS 2003) TO THE
BOARD OF GOVERNORS 4 (2004), available at http://www.wsba.org/lawyers/groups/ethics2003/
reportpartl .doc [hereinafter WSBA REPORT].
5. Id.
6. ld. at 9-15.
7. Press Release, Wash. State Bar Ass'n, Special Committee for the Evaluation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct (Ethics 2003 Committee): Current Status (July 14, 2006),
http://www.wsba.org/lawyers/groups/ethics2003/default.htm ("By order dated July 10, the Supreme
Court approved the proposed Ethics 2003 amendments to the Rules of Professional Conduct ....
The amended rules will be effective on September 1, 2006."); Ethics 2003 Amendments to Rules of
Professional Conduct Adopted, WASH. STATE BAR NEWS, August 2006, at 44.
8. See WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6, 3.3 (2006).
9. WSBA REPORT, supra note 4, at 179, available at http://www.wsba.org/lawyers/groups/
ethics2003/reportpart3.doc. The full text of 2003 Model Rule 3.3 is as follows:
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false
statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the law-
yer;
(2) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction
known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not
disclosed by opposing counsel; or
(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer, the lawyer's
client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence and the
lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial
measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. A lawyer may re-
fuse to offer evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal
matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.
(b) A lawyer who represents a client in an adjudicative proceeding and who knows that a
person intends to engage, is engaging, or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct
related to the proceeding shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary,
withdrawal or disclosure to the tribunal.
(c) The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) continue to the conclusion of the proceed-
ing, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected
by Rule 1.6.
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Information, with minor changes.' 0 Adoption of Model Rules 1.6 and 3.3
would have reversed the previous Washington rule concerning attorney
candor to the tribunal." Washington's previous 1985 version of Rule
3.312 preserved a lawyer's duty to keep client confidences, governed by
Rule 1.6,' 3 over a lawyer's duty to be truthful to the court, governed by
Rule 3.3.14 The 1985 Washington Rules of Professional Conduct (1985
(d) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts
known to the lawyer that will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether
or not the facts are adverse.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2003).
10. WSBA REPORT, supra note 4, at app. D, at 1-6, available at http://www.wsba.org/lawyers/
groups/ethics2003/ appendixd.doc. The full text of Model Rule 1.6 is as follows:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless
the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry
out the representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably
certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of
another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's
services;
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or
property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the
client's commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has
used the lawyer's services;
(4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these Rules;
to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy be-
tween the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or
civil action against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was in-
volved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's
representation of the client; or
(5) to comply with other law or a court order.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2003).
11. See WSBA REPORT, supra note 4, at 13.
12. WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (1985), available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/
courtrules/?fa=court-rules.list&group=ga&set-RPC.
13. Id. at R. 1.6.
14. Id. at R. 3.3. The full text of Washington's 1985 Rule 3.3 is as follows:
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(I) Make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;
(2) Fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to
avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client unless such disclosure
is prohibited by rule 1.6;
(3) Fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction
known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not
disclosed by opposing counsel;
(4) Offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.
(b) The duties stated in section (a) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding.
(c) If the lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the law-
yer shall promptly disclose this fact to the tribunal unless such disclosure is prohibited by
rule 1.6.
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Washington RPC) guaranteed that, if these two duties conflicted, the
duty of protecting client confidences prevailed. 5 If the 2003 Model
Rules 1.6 and 3.3 had been adopted, the presumption would have been
reversed, and the duty of truthfulness to the court would have trumped
the duty of confidentiality.' 6 Wisely, the Washington Supreme Court
chose not to follow the WSBA's recommendations and, for the most
part, maintained the balance between Rule 1.6 confidences and Rule 3.3
candidness.
17
The discrepancies between the rules proposed by the Ethics 2003
Committee and those ultimately adopted by the court are symptoms of
the current hot-button debate in lawyer ethics concerning lawyers acting
simultaneously as private advocates and public servants.' 8 Too often the
ethics debate is framed by rhetoric based on legal or theoretical maxims,
causing the debate to be ensconced in ethical catchphrases: "lawyers
must be zealous advocates"; "lawyers owe a duty to the court."' 9 Some-
day, perhaps, legal scholars and practitioners will break out of the rheto-
ric and embrace a new way of thinking and talking about legal ethics.2 °
(d) If the lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, and dis-
closure of this fact is prohibited by rule 1.6, the lawyer shall promptly make reasonable
efforts to convince the client to consent to disclosure. If the client refuses to consent to
disclosure, the lawyer may seek to withdraw from representation in accordance with rule
1.15.
(e) A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.
(f) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all relevant facts
known to the lawyer that should be disclosed to permit the tribunal to make an informed
decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.
(g) Constitutional law defining the right to assistance of counsel in criminal cases may
supersede the obligations stated in this rule.
Id.
15. See id.
16. WSBA REPORT, supra note 4, at 13.
17. See Press Release, Wash. State Bar Ass'n, Supreme Court Adopts "Ethics 2003" Amend-
ments to Rules of Professional Conduct (July 2006), available at http://www.wsba.org/lawyers/
groups/ethics2003/rpcarticleO7O6.pdf [hereinafter WSBA Press Release] ("The Supreme Court opted
to retain Washington's variant approach which prohibits any disclosure to the tribunal that is not
permitted by RPC 1.6.").
18. Compare WSBA REPORT, supra note 4, at 36-40, 89-92, with WASH. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.6, 3.3 (2006); see W. Bradley Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 363,
367-72 (2004) (describing the "remarkably stable debate [that] has developed in legal ethics be-
tween those who argue that a lawyer should always act on the balance of first-order moral reasons as
they would apply to a similarly situated nonlawyer actor, and those who believe that a lawyer is
prohibited from taking into account certain ordinary first-order moral reasons because of some fea-
ture of the lawyer's role, such as the obligations of partisanship and neutrality.").
19. See WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. cmt. 8 (2006) ("[A] lawyer can be a consci-
entious and ardent advocate on behalf of a client and at the same time assume that justice is being
done.").
20. See William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1083
(1988). Professor Simon argues that we should adopt a discretion driven system of legal ethics, with
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However, this Comment does not address or propose radical changes.
Rather, this Comment embraces the usual rhetoric and the realities that
practicing lawyers face.
Washington lawyers will soon confront a bevy of new ethical rules,
and this Comment explores two of those rules: Rule 1.6 and Rule 3.3.2
This Comment explores the critical changes to Rule 1.6 and Rule 3.3,
discusses how those changes will affect Washington lawyers, and argues
that although adopted Rules 1.6 and 3.3 continue Washington's tradition
of balancing candor and confidentiality, Rule 3.3 should be expanded to
permit permissive disclosures of client confidences.
Part II begins by exploring the history of the Rules of Professional
Conduct. Part II then briefly turns to the origins of the modern debate
over candor and confidentiality and focuses on two of the most essen-
tially opposed and well known scholars on the issue, Judge Marvin
Frankel and Professor Monroe Freedman. 22 Part III dissects Washing-
ton's newly adopted RPC, focusing on Rules 1.6 and 3.3.23 Part IV sug-
gests that although the new rules mostly balance a client's interest in
confidentiality with a court's interest in candor, attorneys should be
given the discretion to reveal client confidences when necessary. In con-
clusion, Part V proposes a slightly different version of Rule 3.3. This
different version would give lawyers support in making decisions that
maintain the delicate balance between candor and confidentiality.
II. THE HISTORY OF LEGAL ETHICS
The purpose of this section is to explain the evolution of codified
ethical laws. First, this section will look at the beginnings of legal ethics
in America and briefly survey how the ethics laws have addressed attor-
ney candor. Second, this section will examine the history of attorney-
attorneys ultimately seeking to "do justice." Id. His basic maxim is that "[t]he lawyer should take
those actions that, considering the relevant circumstances of the particular case, seem most likely to
promote justice." Id. at 1090. Professor Simon also argues that categorical rules, such as those the
ABA promulgates, fail to adequately address the realities of practicing lawyers. ld at 1092.
21. "1 suspect that most lawyers, when they hear 'ethics' think, first, that something cosmically
boring is about to be said, which one would only listen to in order to satisfy a bar admission or con-
tinuing legal education requirements; or else that they are about to hear some unwelcome news about
a conflict of interest disqualifying them from taking on a client." Robert W. Gordon, Why Lawyers
Can't Just Be Hired Guns, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE: LAWYER'S ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND
REGULATIONS 43 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000).
22. Many legal scholars have tackled the issue of confidentiality and candor. See generally
Carol Rice Andrews, Standards of Conduct for Lawyers: An 800-Year Evolution, 57 SMU L. REV.
1385 (2004) (outlining the evolution of standards of conduct for lawyers and discussing scholars
who have contributed to or commented on those standards).
23. See WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6, 3.3 (2006).
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client confidences, and look at the recent history of the debate through
the lens of Judge Frankel and Professor Freedman.
A. The Codification of Ethical Guidelines ofAdvocacy,
Candor and Confidentiality
Confidentiality rules enable lawyers to be more effective advocates
24in the American adversary system. Historically, state bars have gov-
erned codified ethics laws. 25 The codified attorney-client ethics laws de-
veloped relatively recently in American legal history. 26 In the early twen-
tieth century, states slowly began to adopt the rules, and it is only re-
cently that the code has had such a large impact on how attorneys prac-
27tice.
Early writings on legal ethics urged both candor to the court and
devotion to the client. 28 In 1836, one of the first American writers on le-
gal ethics, Professor David Hoffman, drafted "Fifty Resolutions in Re-
gard to Professional Deportment," which, in essence, espoused a view of
maintaining faithfulness to the client except under certain circum-
29stances. Professor Hoffman wrote, "I will never permit professional
zeal to carry me beyond the limits of sobriety and decorum ....30 and
"[s]hould my client be disposed to insist on captious requisitions, or
frivolous and vexatious defences, they shall be neither enforced nor
countenanced by me.",3' But he also wrote, "To my clients I will be faith-
24. Carolyn Crotty Guttilla, Caught Between a Rock and a Hard Place: When Can or Should
an Attorney Disclose a Client's Confidence?, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 707, 713 (1999) ("Both the
[attorney-client] privilege and confidentiality rules enable a lawyer to be more effective in the adver-
sarial process. Historically, however, courts have governed the privilege while bar associations have
controlled the scope of confidentiality.").
25. Id.
26. Id. at 714. The codification of attorney ethics is traced back to the late 1800's. Id.
27. See Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1251-52
(1991) (discussing the eventual legalization of the code and how the crucial step in effecting that
change occurred in 1970).
28. See, e.g., DAVID HOFFMAN, Fifty Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment, in A
COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY: ADDRESSED TO STUDENTS AND THE PROFESSION GENERALLY 752 (2d
ed., William S. Hein & Co. 1968) (1846); G. SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
169 (5th ed. 1884); see generally Hazard Jr., supra note 27, at 1249-52 (discussing Hoffman and
Sharswood in detail).
29. HOFFMAN, supra note 28, at 752; LaRue T. Hosmer & Daniel C. Powell, Schafer's Di-
lemma: Client Confidentiality vs. Judicial Integrity: A Very Different Proposal for the Revision of
Model Rule 1.6, 49 LOY. L. REV. 405, 428 (2003) (noting that, "in short, Hoffman's message was to
stay with the client except under unnamed circumstances.").
30. HOFFMAN, supra note 28, at 752.
31. Id. at 754.
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ful; and in their causes, zealous and industrious. 32 Ultimately, Hoffman
advocated subordinating client loyalty to the goals of justice.33
George Sharswood closely followed Hoffman in 1884 with "An Es-
say on Professional Ethics. '34 Sharswood's piece was a recording of
good lawyering practices, written for new members of the bar to learn
what the older, wiser members presumably already knew. 35 Sharswood,
like Hoffman, simultaneously urged zealous advocacy and professional
and moral restraint.36 One commentator notes that the early writers on
legal ethics, in insisting on candor, truth, simplicity, and professional
zeal, did not recognize the potential for fealty conflict.37 However, be-
cause these writings were mostly recordings of normative lawyer prac-
tices, and no professional sanctions followed from disobedience,38 the
conflicts in the ethical principles were probably not of great consequence
to practicing attorneys.
The State of Alabama followed the lead of Sharswood and Hoffman
and in 1887 became the first state to adopt an official code of ethics.
39
The Alabama Code of Ethics reflected the earlier writings in that profes-
sional standards of legal conduct depended on the mores and honesty of
individual lawyers rather than on the rules and sanctions of the profes-
sion. 40 Thus, there were no official professional repercussions for violat-
ing a provision of the Alabama Code of Ethics.4'
32. Id. at 758.
33. James A. Cohen, Lawyer Role, Agency Law, and the Characterization of "Officer of the
Court," 48 BUFF. L. REV. 349, 366-67 (2000) (discussing Hoffman's treatise as having religious
overtones in the larger context of traditional American treatment of "officers of the court").
34. SHARSWOOD, supra note 28.
35. Hazard Jr., supra note 27, at 1250 ("Sharswood saw himself as imparting the mores of
right-thinking members of the bar").
36. Hosmer & Powell, supra note 29, at 428-29. See also SHARSWOOD, supra note 28, at 73-
74. George Sharswood wrote that an attorney "should never unnecessarily have a personal difficulty
with a professional brother. He should neither give nor provoke insult .... Let him shun most care-
fully the reputation of a sharp practitioner." Id. And, as to client advocacy, he wrote, "Entire devo-
tion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defence [sic] of his rights, and the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability-these are the higher points, which can only satisfy the
truly conscientious practitioner." Id. at 78-80.
37. Hosmer & Powell, supra note 29, at 428-29 (noting that the "authors of these early guiding
principles that cautioned against the danger of professional zeal and recommended the cultivation of
truth, simplicity, and candor also emphasized, but apparently did not recognize, they created the
clear potential for fealty conflict, the ideal of a focus of effort on behalf of the client.").
38. Hazard Jr., supra note 27, at 1249-50.
39. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE LEGAL PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY
AND REGULATION 108 (3d ed. 1994).
40. Hosmer & Powell, supra note 29, at 429 (finding that Alabama's code continued the earlier
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In 1908, the American Bar Association adopted the first national
Canons of Professional Ethics ("Canons"), which were based mostly on
the Code of Ethics adopted by the Alabama Bar Association. 42 The Can-
ons, unlike the modem ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, were
not accompanied by disciplinary guidelines, 43 and were defined as
"statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms the stan-
dards of professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships
with the public, with the legal system, and with the legal profession.A
4
The Canons were subjected to several piecemeal changes for about sev-
enty years, and along the way most states eventually adopted their own
modified version.45
In 1969, the ABA substantially revised the Canons and produced
the first Code of Professional Responsibility. 46 This was the first set of
rules that legally mandated certain behavior from lawyers.47 The new
standards were in the form of rules rather than a list of ethical considera-
tions and were given legal effect in malpractice and misconduct proceed-
ings. 48 Even so, the balance between confidentiality and candor remained
relatively constant. The 1969 Model Code "did not represent a substan-
tial change from the Canons of 1908 in the area of confidentiality. An
attorney had discretion to reveal confidences or secrets to collect a fee,
defend against an accusation, or to prevent a crime.
' '49
The Canons underwent another major reconstruction in 1983, when
the ABA adopted the basic structure of the modem version of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (1983 Model Rules). 50 The 1983 Model
Rules was the first version subject to public debate concerning the confi-
dentiality requirements. 51 The most recent revision, and the one dis-
cussed at length in this article, was published in 2003.52 By 2003, all but
four states had adopted an ethical code significantly similar to that put
42. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, preface (2003).
43. Hosmer & Powell, supra note 29, at 431.
44. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, preliminary statement (1981).
45. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, preface (2003).
46. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, preface (1969).
47. Hazard Jr., supra note 27, at 1251. The 1970 Code consisted of three tiers. Id. The first tier
consisted of ethical pronouncements called "Canons." Id. The second consisted of comments speak-
ing to the profession's traditional ethical rhetoric and were called "Ethical Considerations." Id. The
third tier consisted of disciplinary laws known as "Disciplinary Rules." Id. The first two tiers were
considered admonitory, but third tier violations were enforced with court-imposed penalties. Id.
48. Id.; Hosmer & Powell, supra note 29, at 431.
49. Hosmer & Powell, supra note 29, at 432 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT DR 4-
101 (1980)).
50. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT preface (2003).
51. Limor Zer-Gutman, Revising the Ethical Rules of Attorney-Client Confidentiality: Towards
a New Discretionary Rule, 45 LOY. L. REV. 669, 669 (1999).
52. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2003).
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forth by the ABA.53 As of November 2005, most states had undertaken a
review of the 2003 Model Rules, and several states were in the process of
supplanting code-based structures with Model Rules-based systems.
54
Across the country, there has been a push for uniformity.
55
B. The Pendulum Swings Between Candor and Confidentiality
Since 1836, the conflict between client confidentiality and candor
toward the court has never been resolved.56 Lawyers and legal ethics
scholars still struggle to find a rule that allows maximum justice within
our adversary system.57 Over the last century, the rules governing client
confidentiality and lawyer candor have undergone gradual changes. The
first code adopted by the ABA in 1908, consisting of thirty-two Canons,
recognized that lawyers have "an obligation to represent the client with
undivided fidelity and not to divulge his secrets or confidences., 58 Later
versions also included a duty to protect client confidences, and the duty
was eventually extended to apply even after the attorney-client relation-
ship ended. 59 However, the ABA codes always recognized exceptions to
the duty of confidentiality, and there never was an absolute directive to
maintain client confidences.6 °
These exceptions expanded and contracted over the years. For in-
stance, Canon 41 in the 1908 Standard Code stated the following:
When a lawyer discovers that some fraud or deception has been
practiced, which has been unjustly imposed upon the court or a
party, he should endeavor to rectify it; at first by advising the client,
and if his client refuses to forego the advantage thus unjustly
53. Id. at preface. Progress on the adoption is available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/
alpha states.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2006). Note that the chart only indicates where the states are
in the process of review, it does not note whether the states chose to adopt the ABA Model Rule
language.
54. WSBA REPORT, supra note 4, at 4.
55. Susan E. Carroll, Caught Between a Rock and a Soft Place: Regulating Legal Ethics to
Police Corporate Governance in the United States and Hong Kong, 14 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 35,
43 (2005) (noting that while there has been a "strong push for national uniformity, federalism con-
cerns continue to block standardization of state legal ethics.").
56. Zer-Gutman, supra note 51, at 669 (declaring that "the ethical duty of confidentiality has
always been controversial").
57. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 74
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1 (2005) (providing another perspective on the history and future of advocacy
ethics, by focusing on the roots of the nineteenth century debate and how those roots have been
assimilated and explained successfully).
58. See Hosmer & Powell, supra note 29, at 429 (describing the history of the Codes).
59. Id. at 429-30.
60. Id. at 430.
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gained, he should promptly inform the injured person or his coun-
sel, so that they may take appropriate steps.
6 '
However, later versions were viewed as more pro-client and pro-
confidentiality. 62 For example, the 1969 revisions allowed an attorney to
reveal confidences or secrets only in order to collect a fee, defend against
an accusation, or prevent a crime.63 But, the 1983 Model Rules revealed
another shift; this time away from confidentiality and toward candor.
64
The Model Rules adopted by the ABA in 1983 showed "an erosion of the
overwhelming pro-client, pro-confidentiality approach to attorney-client
communications., 65 Accordingly, the 1983 Model Rules subjected attor-
neys to possible professional discipline for not disclosing to the court
what would otherwise be "contemptuous to conceal.,
66
The ABA's most recent overhaul, dubbed "Ethics 2000," continued
on the pro-candor path by making changes to almost every rule,67 one of
which allows more "whistle-blowing" options for lawyers revealing cli-
ent confidences in the face of future harm or client fraud.68 In addition,
2003 Model Rule 3.3 increases a lawyer's obligation of candor to the
tribunal by eliminating the requirement of materiality.69 The Commission
"deleted the requirement of materiality 70 that now qualifies a lawyer's
61. MODEL CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS, Canon 41 (1967).
62. Crotty Guttilla, supra note 24, at 707-08 (noting that pre-1983 codes were pro-client).
63. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1980).
64. Daniel Walfish, Making Lawyers Responsible for the Truth: The Influence of Marvin
Frankel's Proposals for Reforming the Adversary System, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 613, 635 (2005)
(remarking that recently "the pendulum of the main duty of candor rule has begun to swing in the
direction of more truthfulness.").
65. Crotty Guttilla, supra note 24, at 708.
66. Harry 1. Subin, The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent
Harm, 70 IOWA L. REV. 1091, 1098 (1985). Rule 1.6 required attorneys to safeguard client secrets
except in very limited circumstances. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY R. 1.6 (1983). Yet
Rule 3.3(a)(4) provided that "[i]f a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its
falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures." Id. at R. 3.3(a)(4). The Model Rules
required disclosure of confidential information concerning fraud on the court when the attorney was
the one who offered that evidence to the court. Id. However, the Model Rules were unclear on
whether the attorney was required to disclose false evidence that the lawyer did not offer to the
court. See id. Thus, if a criminal defendant lied on the stand in a "narrative" form, without prompting
or sanction from the attorney, the attorney was most likely not required to disclose that client confi-
dence to the court. Id. For a description of the narrative form of testimony, see infra note 104.
67. Rice Andrews, supra note 22, at 1449.
68. Id. at 1450 (pointing out that the "Ethics 2000 commission had proposed more aggressive
'whistle-blowing' provisions, to allow lawyers to reveal certain client frauds, but the House of Dele-
gates approved only modest additional exceptions to the duty of confidentiality.").
69. Margaret Colgate Love, The Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Summary
of the Work of Ethics 2000, 15 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 441, 464 (2002) (briefly examining the sub-
stantive changes in the 2003 Model Rules).
70. A few Washington cases exist that discuss the meaning of the term "material." Generally,
"material facts" are those facts upon which the outcome of the litigation depends in whole or in part.
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obligation in 3.3(a)(1) not to make a false or misleading statement of fact
or law to a tribunal, 71 and the lawyer's duty to remedy the situation does
not depend on whether the lawyer knowingly or purposefully offered the
false evidence. 72 However, as noted above, Washington has resisted the
"pro-candor" tide shift and retains a more "pro-client" proclivity. 73 Be-
cause of this, Washington is an outlier among the other states.
74
There are two prominent theories regarding the limitation of, or ex-
pansion of exceptions to, the attorney-client duty of loyalty. One theory
is that an erosion of attorney-client confidentiality will result in a less
effective legal system. 75 The opposing theory is that the privilege will
lead to a negative societal view of the legal profession because it appears
as if the attorney is "covering up" for a client who has indeed committed
a criminal or civil wrong.76 Additionally, expansion of attorney-client
confidentiality leads to unjust legal results because the "truth" may be
hidden.77 In the candor-confidentiality discussion, the Freedman-Frankel
debate is probably the most well known. 78
C. The Frankel and Freedman Debate of Candor Versus Confidentiality
In 1974, Judge Marvin Frankel, who had become frustrated with the
"trickery and obfuscation" of the American court system, proposed a
radically different version of the candor rule to the American Bar Asso-
E.g., In Re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Dynan, 152 Wash. 2d 601, 613, 98 P.3d 444, 450
(2004). Also, a materially false statement in the perjury context is any false statement which could
have affected the course or outcome of the proceeding. Id.
71. Colgate Love, supra note 69, at 464.
72. Id.
73. See WSBA Press Release, supra note 17.
74. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., NACDL, Chamber of Commerce, ACLU, ABA, Corporate Counsel Ally in Sup-
port of Attorney-Client Privilege, CHAMPION, Dec. 29, 2005, at NACDL Column, available at
http://www.westlaw.com, 29-DEC Champion 8. For example, the "privilege waiver amendment
weakens, rather than enhances, internal compliance programs. If employees are concerned about
whether attorney-client protections will be honored during internal investigations, they won't be as
candid and forthcoming, undermining one of the most effective means of detecting corporate mis-
conduct." Id. at 9. See also WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. cmt. 8 (2006) ("[A] lawyer
can be sure that preserving client confidences ordinarily serves the public interest because people are
more likely to seek legal advice, and thereby heed their legal obligations, when they know their
communications will be private.").
76. See, e.g., Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1031, 1040 (1975) ("Our relatively low regard for truth-seeking is perhaps the chief reason for the
dubious esteem in which the legal profession is held.").
77. See, e.g., id. at 1040-41. Frankel declares that he is "among those who believe the laity
have ground to question our service in the quest for truth." Id. at 1041.
78. Walfish, supra note 64, at 618 (providing an in-depth discussion of the debate between
Judge Frankel and Monroe Freedman).
Seattle University Law Review
79ciation. In proposing the rule, Judge Frankel was, in part, responding to
the uproar caused by Professor Monroe Freedman's 1966 publication of
an article in which Freedman argued that a criminal defense lawyer has a
duty to: (1) destroy an adverse witness, even if he knows that the witness
is telling the truth; (2) put a witness on the stand even though he knows
the witness will commit perjury; and (3) give his client legal advice even
though he believes his advice will tempt the client to commit perjury.80
The Freedman-Frankel debate in turn sparked numerous legal ethicists to
theorize about the different roles each rule would play in the American
adversarial system.8' Although Freedman's version of the candor rule
was more widely accepted in the years following his proposals, and
Frankel's more soundly derided, the underpinnings of Frankel's sugges-




Judge Frankel proposed several amendments to the rules governing
lawyer ethics that differ notably from the most widely accepted candor
ethics. 83 Frankel's amendments would have required a lawyer to: (1) dis-
close all relevant evidence and prospective witnesses, even when the
lawyer does not intend to offer that evidence and those witnesses; (2)
prevent or report any untrue statement by a client or witness, or any
omission of material fact, that makes other statements misleading; and
(3) at trial, examine witnesses with the purpose and design of eliciting
the whole truth.84 As a member of the commission reviewing the ABA's
Code of Professional Ethics, Frankel succeeded in introducing most of
these provisions into the 1979 draft of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.85 For example, the 1979 draft comments declared that "[t]he
duty to represent a client vigorously, and therein to maintain confidences
of the client, is qualified by the advocate's duty of candor to the tribu-
nal."86 However, the Commission ultimately did not officially release the
79. Id. at 613-14 (2005) (Judge Frankel wrote that the "adversary system rates truth too low
among the values that institutions ofjustice are meant to serve.").
80. Walfish, supra note 64, at 617 (citing Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of
the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1469 (1966)).
81. Id. at 619-26. Walfish outlines several key commentators' positions on the Frankel-
Freedman debate. Id. For example, he discusses Harry Subin's 1987 response to Frankel's critique,
and Professor John Mitchell's response to Subin's response. Id. at 619-21.
82. Id. at 626-28 (although Frankel's ideas are resurfacing, commentators fail to cite Frankel
as a source for change).
83. Id. at 629-35 (detailing Frankel's proposals).
84. Id. at 613-14.
85. Id. at 629.
86. ld. at 630.
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1979 draft because it was met with fierce opposition.87 Monroe Freed-
man was shown a copy of the draft and, immediately outraged, de-
nounced the draft and leaked it to the press.88 The reaction of lawyers
and theorists was equally negative to the proposed duty of candor and
limits on the attorney-client confidentiality protection. 89 Consequently,
Frankel's proposals were cut back in the next few drafts. 90 The duty of
candor provision in the final 1983 version contained few of the restraints
that Frankel pushed for.
91
Judge Frankel's ideals, however, have recently re-emerged in the
legal community. A less stringent version of his proposals can be seen in
the ABA 2003 Model Rules, which offer a broader candor rule than the
previous versions of the Model Rules.92 For example, under the 2003
Model Rules the duty to maintain client confidences is now qualified by
the advocate's duty of candor to the tribunal.93 Also, a lawyer may not
make any false statement, regardless of materiality, and a lawyer must
correct a previous false statement of material fact.94 Additionally, the
lawyer must remedy the effects of false evidence offered by the lawyer,
client or witness. 95 This last revision is a dramatic departure from the
previous rules, where a lawyer was not required to remedy the effects of
false evidence offered by a client or witness.96 Nevertheless, the
"[s]tandards of legal ethics are still a far cry from those Frankel envi-
sioned ... [because the] ABA standards, which have been changed many
times over the past thirty years, do not impose a high standard of truth-
fulness, nor are they worded strongly [enough]. 97
2. Freedman
Freedman's treatise, Lawyers' Ethics in an Adversary System, tack-
les the issue of how "lawyers should respond when faced with a forced
choice between violating the moral imperative to be truthful and the
moral imperatives to keep promises and to respect confidences received
in trust." 98 According to Freedman, when faced with that choice, the dig-
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 630-31.
90. Id. at 634.
9 1. Id.
92. See Colgate Love, supra note 69, at 464 (describing in detail the changes in Rule 3.3).
93. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2003).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (1983).
97. Walfish, supra note 64, at 636-37.
98. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM preface (1975).
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nity of the individual takes precedence over the interests of the state;99
thus, keeping promises prevails. Our system requires absolute candor
between a lawyer and her client as a "client cannot be expected to reveal
to the lawyer all information that is potentially relevant, including that
which may well be incriminating, unless the client can be assured that
the lawyer will maintain all such information in the strictest confi-
dence." 100 Complete trust and disclosure between lawyer and client is
necessary because the adversary system "assumes that the most efficient
and fair way of determining the truth is by presenting the strongest pos-
sible case for each side of the controversy before an impartial judge or
jury,"'' 1 and it is impossible for a lawyer to present the strongest case
without all the information the client has to give.
In his treatise, Freedman parses the conflict into what he calls the
"trilemma": the duty of the lawyer to know everything, to keep it in con-
fidence, and to reveal it to the court. 0 2 To resolve this conflict, he pro-
poses a rule in favor of absolute client confidentiality.10 3 As a conse-
quence, a criminal defense attorney, faced with a client who insists on
perjuring himself, "has a professional responsibility as an advocate in an
adversary system to examine the perjurious client in the ordinary way
and to argue to the jury, as evidence in the case, the testimony presented
by the defendant."'
0 4
Freedman's theories, however, were not accepted without criti-
cism, °5 and the ABA has never gone so far as to adopt similar rules.
99. Id. at 2.
100. Id. at 5.
101. Id. at9.
102. Id. at 28.
103. See id. at 40-41.
104. Id. Thus, Freedman soundly rejected the "narrative" solution found in the ethical stan-
dards of the time. See id. Under the narrative approach, the attorney calls the defendant to the wit-
ness stand but does not engage in the usual question and answer exchange. See People v. Johnson, 62
Cal. App. 4th 608, 620-29, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 805 (1998) (discussing the narrative alternative, along
with other proposed solutions to the "trilemma"). Instead, the attorney permits the defendant to
testify in a free narrative manner. Id. at 624. In closing arguments, the attorney does not rely on any
of the defendant's false testimony. Id.
105. See, e.g., Norman Lefstein, Client Perjury in Criminal Cases: Still in Search of an An-
swer, I GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 521, 524-25 (1988) (arguing that "Professor Freedman's analysis is
predicated on an indefensible premise"); Donald Liskov, Criminal Defendant Perjury: A Lawyer's
Choice Between Ethics, the Constitution, and the Truth, 28 NEw ENG. L. REV. 881, 905 (1994) (opin-
ing that "Freedman's approach may seem practical. However, in practice, a lawyer's use of this
approach may likely end in disciplinary action."); Teresa Stanton Collett, Understanding Freed-
man's Ethics, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 455, 456 (1991) (contending that Freedman's conclusion is the result
of a fundamental misunderstanding of the role of the lawyer because the role of the lawyer is not to
"win" the unwinnable case, nor to legally extort more for the client than the client is entitled to under
the law, but rather to voice the client's perspective artfully and persuasively so that a just resolution
can be reached).
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Rather, the ABA offers a rule that is somewhat closer to the translucent
rule offered by Frankel than the opaque rule offered by Monroe.'0 6 The
next Part explores how the 2006 Washington Rules differ from the
ABA's by compelling attorneys to both be truthful, as Frankel proposed,
and be loyal advocates, as Monroe proposed.
III. AN EXAMINATION OF WASHINGTON'S RULES 1.6 AND 3.3
The previous version of the Washington Rules of Professional
Conduct was adopted in June of 1985. °7 The court adopted a slightly
altered version of the ABA 1983 Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
and chose not to adopt any of the ABA official comments. 0 8 Lawyers in
Washington practiced under the 1985 RPC for over twenty years. How-
ever, in 2003, because of the substantial changes made to the ABA
Model Rules, the WSBA established the Ethics 2003 Committee to re-
view the 1985 rules. 10 9 After much debate, the Confidentiality Subcom-
mittee of the Ethics 2003 Committee voted to adopt Rule 3.3 of the ABA
2003 Model Rules verbatim and Rule 1.6 with changes." 0 The Washing-
ton Supreme Court chose to deviate from the Committee's recommenda-
tions on both rules.'
This Part takes an in-depth look at Washington's 1985 version of
Rules 3.3 and 1.6 and compares that version to Washington's recently
adopted RPC. First, the Ethics 2003 Committee debate is examined. Sec-
ond, the 1985 RPC is compared to Washington's newly adopted RPC,
focusing on Rules 1.6 and 3.3, and the ABA 2003 Model Rules are com-
pared to Washington's newly adopted RPC, also focusing on Rules 1.6
and 3.3.
106. See discussion supra notes 79-104 and accompanying text.
107. Stuart Watt, Confidentiality Under the Washington Rules of Professional Conduct, 61
WASH. L. REV. 913, 913 n.1 (1986) (detailing Rules 1.6 and 3.3 of the 1985 Washington Rules of
Professional Conduct). One of the main concerns when adopting the 2006 Washington RPC was
adoption of the comments; the Washington Supreme Court specifically asked the Ethics 2003 Com-
mittee's opinion about the importance of comments. Letter from Justice Charles W. Johnson, Chair
of Supreme Court Rules Committee (July 12, 2005), available at http://www.wsba.org/lawyers/
groups/ethics2003/ethics2003letter.pdf.
108. Id. at n.7.
109. WSBA REPORT, supra note 4, at 4.
110. Id. at app. D, at 7, available at http://www.wsba.org/lawyers/groups/ethics2003/
appendixd.doc. The Subcommittee split regarding Rule 3.3. Id. However, Rule 3.3(a)(1) was
adopted by a vote of 6-2; Rule 3.3(a)(2) was adopted unanimously because it was the same as Wash-
ington's RPC 3.3 (a)(3); Rule 3.3(a)(3) was adopted by a vote of 9-3; Rule 3.3(b) was adopted by a
vote of 10-2; and Rule 3.3(c) was adopted by a vote of 8-2. Id. at 7-9.
111. See WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6, 3.3 (2006); see also WSBA Press Release,
supra note 17.
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A. The Ethics 2003 Committee's Debate and the Washington
Supreme Court's Decision to Not Adopt Model Rules 1.6 and 3.3
The Ethics 2003 Committee was appointed to undertake a "com-
prehensive study and evaluation of the revised ABA Model Rules, to
consider the suitability of adopting the ABA Ethics 2000 revisions, and
to evaluate the desirability of other appropriate changes to Washington's
RPC.' ' 1" 2 The Ethics 2003 Committee recommended that Washington
follow the 2003 version of the ABA Model Rules unless there was a
compelling reason for deviating from them.'1 3 Hence, the ABA Model
Rules were to serve as a "guiding beacon" of uniformity to the Commit-
tee, as the Committee wished to bring Washington in line with the rest of
the country. 1 4 However, the Ethics 2003 Committee deviated from that
uniformity when the Model Rules were silent on a subject that has "tradi-
tionally and successfully" been litigated in Washington, or where an ex-
isting Washington rule was clearly more suitable."'
The Confidentiality Subcommittee (Subcommittee) in charge of
evaluating whether to adopt Model Rule 3.3 was divided on what course
to take.116 The members of the Subcommittee recognized that adopting
the ABA rule would "involve a major change in Washington law."
'"17
Eventually the Subcommittee voted to adopt the ABA Model Rule 3.3 in
its entirety with the expectation that it would reverse Washington's pre-
sumption that confidentiality trumped candor, so that "candor to a tribu-
112. WASH. STATE BAR ASS'N, GR 9 COVER SHEET, SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS TO THE
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (RPC), http://www.wsba.org/lawyers/groups/ethics2003/ethics
2003gr9coversheet.doc (last visited July 1, 2006).
113. WSBA REPORT, supra note 4, at 6.
114. Id.
115. Id. For example, the Committee decided not to adopt two provisions of Model Rule 1.6.
Id. at 10-11. The Committee concluded that 2003 Model Rule 1.6(b)(6) and 2003 Model Rule
1.6(b)(3) were "incompatible with the duty of confidentiality as established in Washington." Id. at
11. First, Model Rule 1.6(b)(6) would permit a lawyer to reveal confidential client information "to
comply with other law," and the Committee concluded that lawyers "should not be placed in the
dilemma of having to assess the validity" of a provision of "other law." Id. The Committee was
"wary" of the provision being used as an "ideological tool" for the regulation of the practice of law
by non-judicial branches of government. Id. Second, Model Rule 1.6(b)(3) would permit a lawyer to
reveal confidential information to "mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or
property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client's commission
of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client used the lawyer's services." Id. The Committee
concluded that the public interest in preventing fraud was attenuated when the fraud is already com-
plete. Id. At that point, "the balance of interests shifts back to the traditional duties of lawyer-client
loyalty and confidentiality." Id.
116. Id. at app. D, at 7, available at http://www.wsba.org/lawyers/groups/ethics2003/
appendixd.doc; see supra note 110.
I 7. WSBA REPORT, supra note 4, at app. D, at 7, available at http://www.wsba.org/lawyers/
groups/ethics2003/appendixd.doc.
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nal would prevail over a lawyer's obligation to maintain confidential-
ity.
''118
The Subcommittee considered Model Rule 3.3 in conjunction with
Model Rule 1.6 (Confidentiality of Information) to determine how the
two rules would work together to proscribe mandatory and permissive
disclosure of client information in a variety of situations.1" 9 The Commit-
tee's proposed version of Rule 1.6 (which differed from 2003 ABA
Model Rule 1.6)120 provided that a lawyer may reveal, among other
things, client information "relating to the proceeding" to (1) prevent the
client from committing a crime;121 (2) prevent the client from committing
a fraud reasonably certain to result in substantial financial injury when
using the lawyer's services; 122 and (3) prevent reasonably certain death or
substantial bodily harm. 123 These revelations were not mandatory, as the
proposed rule used permissive language such as "may.' 24 However,
unless that revelation fit into one of the prescribed categories, the lawyer
was compelled ("shall") to keep client information relating to the repre-
sentation confidential. 25 Thus, under a pure analysis using proposed
Rule 1.6, the lawyer was not required to reveal any client information;
rather, the lawyer was supported by the rule if she chose to reveal the
information in order to prevent one of the socially unacceptable client
behaviors. 1
26
Washington's proposed Rule 3.3, however, narrowed the scope of
proposed Rule 1.6. When a lawyer faced client fraud or perjury to a tri-
bunal the lawyer's revelations changed from optional to mandatory. The
language of proposed Rule 3.3 was compulsory ("shall"), and covered
lawyer misrepresentations, client misrepresentations, and witness misrep-
resentations to the court. 127 Whereas proposed Rule 1.6 allowed a lawyer
to determine whether revealing client information was the best recourse
for client fraud involving third parties, proposed Rule 3.3 did not give the
lawyer a choice when client fraud involved the court. If a lawyer knew
118. Id.
119. Id., at app. E, at 35, available at http://www.wsba.org/lawyers/groups/ethics2003/
appendixe.doc. ("The subcommittee is working diligently to sort out the interplay of rules 1.6,
3.3(c), and 4.1 with respect to when a lawyer may disclose client crimes and fraud.").
120. Id,. at 146, available at http://www.wsba.org/lawyers/groups/ethics2003/reportpart3.doc.
For example, proposed Rule 1.6 permits disclosure of client confidences to prevent any crime,
whereas Model Rule 1.6 limits disclosure to prevent only certain types of crimes. Id. at 148.
121. WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (Proposed Official Draft 2004).
122. Id. at R. 1.6(b)(3).
123. Id. at R. 1.6(b)(1).
124. Id. at R. 1.6.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at R. 3.3(a)(3).
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that a person intended to engage, was engaging, or had engaged in crimi-
nal or fraudulent conduct "related to the proceeding," the lawyer was
required to take reasonable remedial measures.12 8 In fact, proposed Rule
3.3(c) expressly authorized violations of proposed Rule 1.6 in order to
comply with 3.3(a) and 3.3(b). 2 9
During one of its meetings, the Confidentiality Subcommittee dis-
cussed striking a balance in crafting rules that foster a strong attorney-
client relationship without increasing the negative perception of lawyers
hiding behind the confidentiality protection when a client intends to
commit a crime.' 30 Certain members of the Subcommittee were worried
that too broad a rule in either Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would erode the attor-
ney-client privilege, 131 while other members stressed the need to stay true
to the 2003 Model Rules in order to uphold public expectations of attor-
ney honesty. 132 In addition, several members expressed discomfort with
the idea that Washington would be an outlier, as, at the time, forty-two
other states required disclosure to the court of Rule 1.6 confidences in
certain circumstances. 133 In sum, most of the Subcommittee debate over
the Model Rule version of Rule 3.3 centered on the mandatory nature of
the rule, the sacredness of the attorney-client privilege, and the public
perception of the rule.
As noted above, however, the Washington Supreme Court chose
not to adopt the Committee's recommendations. 34 The next section ex-
plores Washington's adopted rules and compares those rules to the 1985
RPC and the 2003 Model Rules.
128. Id. atR. 3.3(b).
129. Id. at R. 3.3(c) ("The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) continue to the conclusion of
the proceeding, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected
by Rule 1.6.").
130. WSBA REPORT, supra note 4, at app. E, at 35, available at http://www.wsba.org/lawyers/
groups/ethics2003/appendixe.doc. The minutes of the July 9, 2003 meeting indicate that one of the
members of the Subcommittee pointed out that the Subcommittee wanted to strike a balance in craft-
ing rules that fostered a strong attorney-client relationship without augmenting the perception that a
lawyer can hide behind client confidentiality. Id.
131. Id. at 38. For example, on September 23, 2003, Mr. Ehrlichman urged the Subcommittee
to focus on the fundamental principle of client trust that confidences shared with lawyers will be
protected. Id. He also speculated that there are efforts underway to erode the attorney-client privilege
by the federal government. Id.
132. Id. at 49. For example, Professor David Boerner argued on October 8, 2003, that Wash-
ington adopt the ABA Model Rules in order to stay consistent with other states and to stay internally
consistent within the rules of ethics. Id.
133. Id. at 35, 40. On July 9, 2003, Professor Boerner pointed out that Washington is an outlier
among other states when it comes to candor to the tribunal. Id. at 35. At a later meeting on Septem-
ber 3, 2003, Mr. Brusichio pointed out that forty-two other states have stricter disclosure rules than
Washington. Id. at 40.
134. See WSBA Press Release, supra note 17.
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B. Comparison of Washington's 1985 Rules 1.6 and 3.3
with Washington's 2006 Rules 1.6 and 3.3
1. Rule 1.6
In this section Washington's 1985 RPC Rule 1.6 is compared to re-
cently adopted Rule 1.6 and both are compared to the 2003 Model Rules.
All three Rule 1.6 provisions differ significantly. First, 2006 Wash-
ington RPC Rule 1.6 mostly parallels 2003 Model Rule 1.6, but retains
some significantly unique Washington provisions.135 As in the 1985
Washington RPC Rule 1.6, a lawyer shall not reveal information relating
to the client unless authorized either explicitly or impliedly by the client
to do so.1 36 However, the list of permissible situations in which a lawyer
may reveal information has expanded,137 and some of the key terminol-
135. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2003), with WASH. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2006). The complete text of Washington's adopted Rule 1.6 is as follows:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless
the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry
out the representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(I) shall reveal information relating to the representation of a client to prevent
reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;
(2) may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to prevent
the client from committing a crime;
(3) may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to prevent,
mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property of
another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client's
commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the
lawyer's services;
(4) may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to secure
legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these Rules;
(5) may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to estab-
lish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the
lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim
against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to
respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representa-
tion of the client;
(6) may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to comply
with a court order; or
(7) may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to inform a
tribunal about any client's breach of fiduciary responsibility when the client is
serving as a court-appointed fiduciary such as a guardian, personal representa-
tive, or receiver.
WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2006).
136. WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2006).
137. Compare WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (1985), with WASH. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2006).
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ogy has changed. 138 Also, Washington has adopted its first mandatory
disclosure rule.
139
First, and perhaps most insignificantly, the phrase "confidences or
secrets" has been removed and replaced with the word "information"'1
40
(following the lead of the 2003 Model Rules).14 1 "Information" is not
defined, but is much broader than "confidences or secrets.' 42 Comment
19, which is unique to Washington, indicates that the phrase "informa-
tion related to the proceeding" should be interpreted broadly, and should
include the old phrase "confidences or secrets." Comment 4 also pro-
vides support for the supposition that adopted Rule 1.6 protects more
types of information than previous Rule 1.6: the prohibition against re-
vealing information relating to the representation of a client "also applies
to disclosures by a lawyer that do not in themselves reveal protected in-
formation but could reasonably lead to the discovery of such information
by a third person.' 43 The comments specifically point out that a lawyer
may use a hypothetical to discuss client secrets, so long as there is no
chance the listener could guess which client the lawyer was discussing.
44
Second, Washington has adopted most of the Model Rule's permis-
sive disclosure provisions. Under 2006 Washington Rule 1.6, a lawyer
may 145 reveal confidential information for the following reasons: (1) to
prevent a client from committing a crime; 146 (2) to prevent, mitigate, or
rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another
that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client's com-
mission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used
138. See infra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
139. See infra notes 159-65 and accompanying text.
140. WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2006).
141. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2003).
142. Under the old rules, "confidence" referred to information protected by the attorney-client
privilege under applicable law, and "secret" referred to other information gained in the professional
relationship that the client requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embar-
rassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client. WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT termi-
nology (1985). See also WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 19 (2006) (defining "confi-
dence" and "secret" similarly to the 1985 definition).
143. WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 4 (2006).
144. Id. ("A lawyer's use of a hypothetical to discuss issues relating to the representation is
permissible so long as there is no reasonable likelihood that the listener will be able to ascertain the
identity of the client or the situation involved.").
145. A lawyer's decision not to disclose the information does not violate this Rule. Id. at R. 1.6
cmt. 15.
146. Id. at R. 1.6(b)(2). Any crime counts, from murder to shoplifting. Id. However, only in-
formation relating to crimes which have not yet been committed may be revealed. Id. This exception
if vastly different from the Model Rule, which permits a lawyer to reveal information to prevent the
client from committing a crime "that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the finan-
cial interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer's
services." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(2) (2003).
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the lawyer's services; 147 (3) to secure legal advice about compliance with
the rules; 148 (4) to establish a defense on behalf of the lawyer in a contro-
versy between the lawyer and client; 149 (5) to comply with a court or-
der; 50 and (6) to inform the tribunal of a breach of the client's court-
appointed fiduciary duties.'15 Most of these provisions were present in
the 1985 Rule in some form or other.' 52 Additional permissive disclo-
sures not present in 1985 Washington RPC Rule 1.6 include the follow-
ing: (1) preventing reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;
53
and (2) preventing, mitigating, or rectifying substantial injury to the fi-
nancial interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result
or has resulted from the client's commission of a crime or fraud in fur-
therance of which the client has used the lawyer's services. 1
5 4
Noticeably, Washington has chosen to retain the unique provision
allowing disclosures for any crime, from murder to shoplifting. 155 Under
Washington's Rule, information relating to any crimes which have not
yet been committed may be revealed. 56 The broad permissive disclosure
provision is different from the Model Rule, which only permits a lawyer
to reveal information to prevent the client from committing a crime "that
is reasonably certain to result in a substantial injury to the financial inter-
ests or property of another and in furtherance of which the client has
used the lawyer's services" or is "reasonably certain [to result] in death
or substantial bodily harm.' ' 157 The 2003 Ethics Committee recom-
mended retaining Washington's unique, expansive rule in addition with
the added provision of "reasonably certain" death or bodily harm because
"there are imaginable circumstances ... in which noncriminal acts may
result in reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm .... 58
147. WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(3) (2006). The Ethics 2003 Committee did
not want to adopt all of Model Rule 1.6(b)(3). WSBA REPORT, supra note 4, at 11. The Committee
concluded that "although the public interest is heightened when a lawyer is in a position to prevent
future fraud, that urgency is attenuated when the fraud is already complete." Id. Thus, the Commit-
tee thought omitting the "past-fraud" exception would strike the appropriate balance. Id. Obviously,
the Washington Supreme Court disagreed because it adopted the Model Rule version. Compare
WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(3) (2006), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 1.6(b)(3) (2003).
148. WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(4) (2006).
149. Id. at R. 1.6(b)(5).
150. Id. at R. 1.6(b)(6).
151. Id. at R. 1.6(b)(7).
152. See WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b), (c) (1985).
153. WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2006).
154. Id. at R. 1.6(b)(3).
155. Id. at R. 1.6(b)(2).
156. Id.
157. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(l), (2).
158. WSBA REPORT, supra note 4, at 148, available at http://www.wsba.org/lawyers/groups/
ethics2003/reportpart3.doc.
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Third, the Washington Supreme Court has decided to adopt a provi-
sion that has no parallel in either the proposed rules or the Model Rules:
a mandatory disclosure to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial
bodily harm. 159 This new provision is a dramatic departure from the 1985
RPC. 160 All the "exceptions" in the previous Rule 1.6 were permissive1
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and none specifically addressed death or bodily harm. 162 Previously, Rule
1.6 allowed disclosures to prevent the commission of a crime.163 The new
rule allows for (and requires) more comprehensive disclosures because a
lawyer must now reveal confidences where harm is likely even though
the crime has already been committed. 64 Or, indeed, even if the harm is
not related to a crime, the lawyer is required to report the potential harm
to authorities.
65
Fourth, the Washington Supreme Court has also chosen not to fol-
low Model Rule 1.6(b) and permit a lawyer to reveal information to
comply with "other law.' 166 The court omitted the phrase because it
would authorize the lawyer to decide when to waive confidentiality and
that right belongs to the client.
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2. Rule 3.3
When adopting the RPC in 1985, the supreme court chose not to
follow the ABA's 1983 version of Rule 3.3.168 The 1983 ABA Model
159. Compare WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2006), with WASH. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1985), and MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(l) (2003). This
is a dramatic change from Washington's 1985 RPC. By contrast, the counterpart Model Rule desig-
nates this as a permissive rather than a mandatory disclosure. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.6(b)(1) (2003). Comment 6 provides an example: "a lawyer who knows that a client has acciden-
tally discharged toxic waste into a town's water supply must reveal this information to the authori-
ties if there is a present and substantial risk that a person who drinks the water will contract a life
threatening or debilitating disease." WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 6 (2006).
160. Compare WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2006), with WASH. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1985).
161. WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (1985).
162. Id.
163. Id. at R. 1.6(b)(l).
164. See WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(l) (2006). Under the new rules, if the
crime has been committed but there is a future chance of harm because of the criminal act, the law-
yer must report the act. See id Under former Rule 1.6, if the crime had already passed, there was no
provision allowing the attomey to reveal the client conduct even to prevent reasonably certain death
or bodily harm. See WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (1985).
165. See WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(l) (2006) (there is no qualification
under the new rule that the information has to be related to a client's criminal conduct; any informa-
tion that would prevent a reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm qualifies).
166. Compare WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(6) (2006), with MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(6) (2003).
167. WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 24 (2006).
168. Watt, supra note 107, at 913 (noting that the subject area of confidentiality, in particular,
differed from the ABA Model Rules).
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Rule 3.3(a)(4) provided that "[i]f a lawyer has offered material evidence
and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable reme-
dial measures."'1 69 In addition, that duty applied even if the lawyer was
required to violate Rule 1.6 and reveal client confidences.170 For exam-
ple, if a lawyer unwittingly offered false evidence, and then came to
know of that falsity, the lawyer had a subsequent duty to remedy the
situation, even if it meant disclosing information considered confidential
under Rule 1.6.'1' The remedies required of the lawyer consisted of con-
vincing the client to come clean, withdrawing from representation, or
disclosing the fraud to the court. 172 But, under the 1983 ABA Model
Rules, if a lawyer had not been the one to offer the evidence, but knew
the evidence was false, the lawyer was not required, nor allowed, to rem-
edy the situation. 173
Washington's 1985 version of RPC Rule 3.3 parted ways with the
ABA's 1983 version when it came to revealing client confidences.
74
Washington's candor rule paralleled the ABA's 1983 Rule 3.3 in most
respects, except it made an allowance for information that would nor-
mally be classified as confidential under Rule 1.6.175 Washington's 1985
Rule 3.3(a)(2) read exactly the same as the 1983 Model Rule 3.3(a)(2),
except that the Washington rule added "unless such disclosure is prohib-
169. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(4) (1984). The full text of the 1983 ABA
Model Rule 3.3 is as follows:
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;
(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to
avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client;
(3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction
known to the lawyer to be directly or adverse to the position of the client and
not disclosed by opposing counsel; or
(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered
material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take rea-
sonable remedial measures.
(b) The duties stated in paragraph (a) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding, and
apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule
1.6.
(c) A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.
Id. at R. 3.3.
170. Id.
17 1. See id.
172. See id at R. 3.3 cmts.
173. See id. at R. 3.3.
174. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (1984), with WASH. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (1985).
175. See id.
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ited by Rule 1.6."' 176 In addition, the 1985 Washington RPC also con-
tained a provision with no parallel in the ABA version:
If the lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of
its falsity, and disclosure of this fact is prohibited by Rule 1.6, the lawyer
shall promptly make reasonable efforts to convince the client to consent
to disclosure. If the client refuses to consent to disclosure, the lawyer
may seek to withdraw from the representation in accordance with Rule
1.15.177
Thus, Washington's former candor rule favored protecting client
confidences over revealing fraud or perjury to the court.178 Washington's
former rule, however, was on par with the ABA's rule with regard to
lawyer candor (as compared to lawyers' remedies for client untruthful-
ness). 79 A lawyer in Washington had an affirmative duty not to know-
ingly offer false evidence, or knowingly put a witness on the stand who
was going to lie. However, the lawyer did not have an affirmative duty to
disclose to the court that her witness had lied on the stand, or destroyed
relevant documents, if the lawyer had come to know of that information
because of Rule 1.6 confidences. 
180
Washington's 2006 RPC Rule 3.3 is almost exactly the same as the
1985 RPC Rule 3.3; the court chose to retain Washington's variant ap-
proach, which prohibits any disclosure to the tribunal that is not permit-
ted by Rule 1.6.81 However, there are several minor changes to Rule
176. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(2) (1984) ("[A lawyer shall not
knowingly] fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assist-
ing a criminal or fraudulent act by the client."), with WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(2)
(1985) ("[A lawyer shall not knowingly] [f]ail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclo-
sure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client unless such disclosure is
prohibited by rule 1.6.").
177. WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(d) (1985).
178. See id at R. 3.3.
179. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (1984), with WASH. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (1985).
180. WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (1985); see generally Watt, supra note 107, at
922-24 (describing in detail the intricacies of Rule 3.3).
181. See WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2006); see WSBA Press Release, supra
note 17. The complete text of adopted rule 3.3 is as follows:
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false
statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the law-
yer;
(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to
avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client unless such disclosure
is prohibited by Rule 1.6;
(3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction
known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not
disclosed by opposing counsel; or
(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.
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3.3.182 First, former Rule 3.3 stated, "A lawyer shall not knowingly make
a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal."'18 3 The rule now
states, "A lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or
law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law
previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer."' 84 Note, the word "mate-
rial" has been deleted, so that a lawyer may not knowingly make any
false statement of fact or law, regardless of materiality.185 Additionally, if
a lawyer comes to know of a false statement previously made, the lawyer
must correct that statement, but only if it was material.1
8 6
The rest of the provisions are the same as the former rule. 87 For ex-
ample, a lawyer may not offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be
false; 8 8 if a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of
its falsity, the lawyer shall promptly disclose this fact to the tribunal
unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.189 When disclosure is in fact
prohibited by Rule 1.6, the lawyer should try and convince the client to
consent to disclosure; 90 if this fails, the lawyer may seek to withdraw.191
Also, a lawyer may choose to refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer
reasonably believes is false, but is not obligated to refuse to offer such
evidence. 1
92
(b) The duties stated in paragraph (a) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding.
(c) If the lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the law-
yer shall promptly disclose this fact to the tribunal unless such disclosure is prohibited by
Rule 1.6.
(d) If the lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, and dis-
closure of this fact is prohibited by Rule 1.6, the lawyer shall promptly make reasonable
efforts to convince the client to consent to disclosure. If the client refuses to consent to
disclosure, the lawyer may seek to withdraw from the representation in accordance with
Rule 1.16.
(e) A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.
(f) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts
known to the lawyer that will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether
or not the facts are adverse.
WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2006).
182. Compare WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2006), with WASH. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (1985).
183. WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1) (1985).
184. WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1) (2006).
185. See id
186. See id.
187. Compare WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2006), with WASH. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (1985).
188. WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(4) (2006).
189. Id. at R. 3.3(c).
190. Id. at R. 3.3(d).
191. Id. at R. 3.3(d).
192. Id. at R. 3.3(e).
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Strangely, the Washington Supreme Court struck the provision that
read "[c]onstitutional law defining the right to assistance of counsel in
criminal cases may supersede the obligations stated in this rule."' 93 The
court also did not adopt the Model Rule's parallel provision, "A lawyer
may refuse to offer evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in a
criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes is false."' 94 The
Washington comments provide that the duties in paragraph (a) apply to
all lawyers, including defense counsel in criminal cases. 95 Thus, a
criminal defense counsel, and all other counsel, must refuse to offer false
evidence, including perjured testimony. 196 If a client insists on testifying
falsely and the attorney cannot prevent the client from testifying falsely,
the attorney must alert the court to the potential problem and seek to
withdraw. 197 However, the attorney cannot reveal what constitutes the
actual Rule 1.6 confidence; rather, the attorney must waive a red flag for
the judge in a general sort of way.1 98 In this respect, among others, the
2003 ABA Model Rule 3.3 differs from the ABA 1983 Model Rule 3.3,
and the 2006 Washington RPC Rule 3.3.199
Another disparity among the rules is the treatment of non-lawyers
who offer false evidence. All the rules mandate that if a lawyer came to
know of the false material that the lawyer had offered as evidence, then
the lawyer had a duty to take reasonable remedial measures.20° Remedial
measures included persuading the client to rectify the situation, or, if
193. WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(g) (1985).
194. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2003).
195. WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 7 (2006).
196. See id.
197. See id. at cmt. 6, 7, 11; State v. Berrysmith, 87 Wash. App. 268, 275, 944 P.2d 397, 401
(1997). The Berrysmith court wrote:
[A] lawyer who reasonably believes that his or her client intends to commit perjury and
cannot be dissuaded from that course is ethically bound to withdraw unless the court, af-
ter being so advised, refuses to permit withdrawal. The question for the court, therefore,
is whether the lawyer reasonably believes that the client intends to commit perjury and
cannot be dissuaded, and not whether the client in fact intends to commit perjury and
cannot be dissuaded.
Berrysmith, 87 Wash. App. at 275, 944 P.2d at 401.
198. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(c)-(d) (2003). If the lawyer offers false
evidence, he must disclose that fact to the court, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6. Id. If
disclosure is prohibited, the attorney may seek to withdraw. Id. Regardless, the attorney may not
help the client perpetuate a fraud upon the court; thus, the only alternative is to make a "noisy with-
drawal." See id at R. 1.2(d).
199. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (1983), with MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2003), and WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2006).
200. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(4) (1983), with MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2003), and WASH. RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(c), (d) (1985),
and WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(c), (d) (2006).
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necessary, withdrawing from representation. 20 The 2003 Model Rules,
however, extend that mandate to remedy false material produced by the
lawyer's client and any witnesses called by the lawyer.20 2 Thus, 2003
Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) covers the situation where, if the lawyer comes to
know of false evidence offered by the lawyer's client, or a witness called
by the lawyer, then the lawyer has an affirmative duty to take remedial
203action.
The 2006 Washington Rule 3.3(c) parts ways with the 2003 Model
Rule 3.3(a)(3) in that when a Washington lawyer discovers past materi-
ally fraudulent evidence that has been offered, the lawyer must inform
the court unless that information is protected by Rule 1.6.204 Also, the
2006 RPC 3.3(a)(4) reads, "[A lawyer shall not knowingly] offer evi-
dence that the lawyer knows to be false., 20 5 The provision does not in-
clude a duty to remedy the situation if the "lawyer's client, or a witness
called by the lawyer, has offered the evidence and the lawyer comes to
know of its falsity. '20 6 Thus, it appears that the omission of those words
by the Washington Supreme Court endorses the view that a lawyer is not
under a duty to remedy the situation when a witnesses has lied, or when
the client has lied and disclosure would not be "necessary to avoid assist-
ing a criminal or fraudulent act.,
20 7
Perhaps the most striking difference among the rules is a new para-
graph added to the 2003 Model Rules which reads: "A lawyer who repre-
sents a client in an adjudicative proceeding and who knows that a person
intends to engage, is engaging, or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent
conduct related to the proceeding shall take reasonable remedial meas-
ures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. ' 0 8 Because few
states have yet to adopt this provision,20 9 and no courts have interpreted
201. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 11 (1983), with MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmts. 10-11 (2003), and WASH. RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(c), (d)
(1985), and WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(d) (2006).
202. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2003) ("If a lawyer, the lawyer's client,
or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its
falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the
tribunal.").
203. Id.
204. WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(c) (2006).
205. Id. at R. 3.3(a)(4).
206. See id; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2003).
207. See supra notes 202-06 and accompanying text.
208. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(b) (2003), with MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (1983).
209. Progress on the adoption is available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/alpha states.html
(last visited August 1I, 2006). Note that the chart only indicates where the states are in the process
of review; it does not note whether the states chose to adopt the ABA Model Rule language. The
four most recent states other than Washington to adopt the Model Rules are Ohio in August of 2006,
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its application, 21 it is difficult to tell how this new paragraph will affect
the lawyer's duty of candor to the tribunal in states that adopt the Model
Rules. In considering whether to adopt the ABA 2003 Model Rules, the
Washington Supreme Court made a wise decision to wholly delete the
ABA's version211 of the new, untried 3.3(b) provision.
One possible explanation for the disparity among these rules is that
the legal community still struggles to find the right balance between
courts and clients. The next section explores the struggle and the tensions
placed on a lawyer by Rules 1.6 and 3.3 and recommends allowing law-
yers discretion as to when to reveal client confidences to the court.
IV. F1ND1NG THE BALANCE FOR RULES 3.3 AND 1.6
Legitimate and pressing concerns have triggered the legal commu-
nity's renewed focus on client fraud and lawyer cover-ups. 2  Lawyers
helping their clients defraud investors and the public is unacceptable, and
the concerns of protecting societal interests, and maintaining positive
public perceptions and the integrity of the legal system, render turning a
blind eye to lawyer fraud unthinkable. That said, the new versions of
Rule 3.3 and Rule 1.6 do not provide attorneys with adequate discretion
to handle the wide variety of ethical dilemmas they will inevitably face.
First, this section explores the tension created when a lawyer is expected
to conform to Washington's adopted rule. Second, this section argues
that neither Washington's unique rule nor the Model Rule allows lawyers
enough discretion to employ a solution to an individual ethical dilemma.
Nebraska in June of 2005, Iowa in March of 2005, and Oregon in January of 2005. Id. Nebraska
adopted Rule 3.3 verbatim. NEB. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2005). Ohio also adopted Rule
3.3 and Rule 1.6 verbatim, and the new rules take effect February 2007. OHIO RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.6, 3.3 (2007), available at http://www.supremecourtofohio.gov/Atty-
Svcs/ProfConduct/rules/default.asp#Rulel_6. Iowa adopted Model Rule 3.3 verbatim, IOWA RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 32:3.3 (2005), but, Oregon chose to continue protecting Rule 1.6 confi-
dences. OR. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2005), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/links.html.
210. As far as research shows, there are no published cases addressing the 2003 Model Rule
version of Rule 3.3(b) as of July 2006.
211. The Supreme Court did not follow the recommendation of the Subcommittee, which
endorsed the new provision. See WSBA REPORT, supra note 4, at 179 (2004), available at
http://www.wsba.org/lawyers/groups/ethics2003/reportpart3.doc (asserting that proposed Rule 3.3
restructures existing RPC 3.3 and, in some cases, substantively alters the duties established in the
existing version of the RPC).
212. See Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel as Gate-
keeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 984-88 (2005) (discussing the recent Enron scandal, the broader
implications of in-house counsel facilitating illegal transactions, and Congress' decision to make
lawyers the public's gatekeepers of our national securities market by enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002).
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A. Ethical Principles Create Tension
Washington's new rules, as do all ethical rules, create a lot of ten-
sion for an attorney because the attorney must balance competing duties
to zealously advocate on behalf of a client and to be an officer of the
court. These two competing duties are both essential cornerstones of the
American legal system. First, the adversary system requires attorneys to
be devoted advocates for their clients, 13 and the attorney-client privilege
is the lynchpin of that requirement.2 14 Second, the legal system and the
215public's perception of its integrity depend on attorney trustworthiness.
The eternal struggle is in how to efficiently maximize both tenets and
keep true to the ideals of each.21 6 This Comment does not propose to
217solve the struggle to balance these duties. However, this Comment
does argue that the recently adopted Washington RPC do not provide the
attorney with the discretion to make the difficult and complicated choice
between loyalty to clients and loyalty to courts.
1. Loyalty to Clients
America's adversarial system is the product of the deeply-held pre-
sumption of innocence and our constitutional rights under the Fifth
213. See Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, in THE LEGAL PROFESSION:
RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 196-200, (Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Deborah L. Rhode eds., 3d
ed. 1994) (finding that there are two common justifications for zealous representation: one, advocat-
ing on behalf of those who are factually guilty is necessary to protect those who are factually inno-
cent, and two, protection of rights).
214. Crotty Guttilla, supra note 24, at 709. Guttilla points out that the duty of a lawyer to pre-
serve a client confidence is one of the most important obligations imposed on an attorney. She lists
three reasons why the attorney-client relationship is so important. First, to maintain the adversary
system, parties must utilize attorneys and attorneys must have sufficient information to effectively
represent their client. Second, lawyers must know all relevant facts to advocate effectively. Third,
clients will not confide in lawyers unless the client knows that what she said will remain confiden-
tial. Id.
215. Cynthia L. Fountaine, In the Shadow ofAtticus Finch: Constructing a Heroic Lawyer, 13
WIDENER L.J. 123, 144-46 (2003) (outlining the public's negative perception of lawyers and point-
ing out that this lack of credibility undermines a lawyer's ability to effectively represent clients
because ofjudicial recognition of lawyer honesty).
216. This article does not go into alternate forms of legal systems. This article assumes that we
are working in the American adversary legal system. Many authors have proposed revising the
American legal system, or adopting a Continental-style legal system. For an in-depth look at this
issue, see generally John Leubsdorf, Three Models of Professional Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REV.
1021 (1982).
217. Simon, supra note 20, at 1133. According to Simon:
[T]he lawyer has been both an advocate and an 'officer of the court' with responsibilities
to third parties, the public, and the law. There has never been a consensus about where to
draw the line between these two aspects of the lawyer's role, and the two have always
been in tension within the professional culture.
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Amendment. 218 The theory behind the adversarial system is to protect
against the possibility of an innocent person's unjust conviction and thus
to preserve the integrity of society itself.219 The insistence on a commit-
ted advocate "marks society's determination to keep unsoiled and be-
yond suspicion the procedures by which men are condemned for a viola-
tion of its laws." 220 Indeed, this determination that all persons deserve
zealous advocacy, even those who are factually guilty, has been, by and
large, successfully defended by legal scholars.22' Professor Deborah L.
Rhode believes there are two main reasons why zealous representation of
clients is essential.222 The first is that defense of clients whom an attor-
ney believes to be factually guilty is necessary to "protect those who are
factually, or legally innocent., 223 The American system proceeds on the
assumption that guilt is best determined "not in the privacy of one law-
yer's office but in open court under due process. ''224 And without the
probability of a zealous defense, prosecutors and police have little incen-
tive to thoroughly investigate the facts, corroborate a complainant's
story, or follow up on other leads.225
The second justification for zealous representation involves the pro-
tection of rights. Professor Rhodes suggests that "[w]here individuals'
lives, liberty, and reputation are so directly at risk, they deserve one ad-
218. See Rhode, supra note 213, at 196-200; see also Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System
Law, in THE LEGAL PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 180-81 (Geoffrey C. Hazard,
Jr. & Deborah L. Rhode eds., 3d ed. 1994); see also Deborah L. Rhode, The Future of the Legal
Profession. Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 665, 668 (1993) (finding that our
legal model rests on two assumptions, one of which is that partisan advocacy provides the most
effective protection for individual constitutional rights).
219. Fuller, supra note 218, at 180-81.
220. Id at 181.
221. See infra notes 222-25 and accompanying text.
222. Rhode, supra note 213, at 196-200.
223. Id. at 197.
224. Deborah L. Rhode, An Adversarial Exchange on Adversarial Ethics: Text, Subtext, and
Context, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 29, 32 (1991); see also John B. Mitchell, Reasonable Doubts Are Where
You Find Them: A Response to Professor Subin's Position on the Criminal Lawyer's "Different
Mission," I GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 339, 345 (1987) (arguing that in a trial there are no such things as
facts, "there is only information, lack of information, and chains of inferences therefrom").
225. Rhode, supra note 213, at 197; see also John B. Mitchell, The Ethics of the Criminal
Defense Lawyer: New Answers to Old Questions, 32 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1980). Professor Mitchell
describes a defense attorney's function as "making the screens work." Id. at 298. The screening
process happens at every level of society and is a method of sorting out those who have deviated
from society's laws from those who have not. Id. at 300. The lawyer's job is make sure that the
screen is correctly applied at every level. Id. at 303. The defense attorney who insists on advocating
for her client plays an integral role in checking that the built-in screens work. Id. For example, the
police will be careful to follow the built-in screens society has placed (such as being required to have
a reasonable suspicion before stopping a pedestrian) because if they do not the defense attorney will
bring that fact out at trial. Id. at 303-07.
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vocate without competing loyalties to the state. '2 6 Moreover, Rhodes
claims that penalizing clients for making disclosures to their lawyers
suggesting guilt would "effectively force an impermissible choice be-
tween Fifth and Sixth Amendment guarantees., 227 The conditions of con-
finement in America's prisons, coupled with the potential for govern-
mental repression, creates the need for both the Sixth Amendment right
to effective assistance of counsel and the Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination.22 8 Forcing lawyers to reveal client confidences would
violate the defendant's right to both.229
2. Loyalty to Courts
The reliance of the judicial system upon the trustworthiness of at-
torneys competes with the need for zealous advocacy. As members of a
self-governing profession, lawyers impose a high ethical standard on
themselves.230 Lawyers often view themselves as public servants and
moral activists, with a sense of fulfilling a civic obligation to promote
justice.231 For example, Justice Louis Brandeis believed that attorneys
should take advantage of the opportunity the law provides to promote
justice through reform activity and client counseling.23 2 Additionally,
because most lawyers can readily tell the difference between "making
good-faith efforts to comply with a plausible interpretation of the pur-
226. Rhode, supra note 213, at 198.
227. Id. at 199.
228. Id. at 199.
229. United States v. Midgett, 342 F.3d 321, 327 (4th Cir. 2003). In Midgett, a criminal defen-
dant wished to take the stand on his own behalf and testify that someone else had committed the
crimes. Id. at 322-23. The defendant was told to "waive either his right to counsel or his right to
testify because neither his counsel nor the court was satisfied that his testimony would be truthful."
Id. at 327. The appellate court found that "[i]n doing so, the [trial] court leveled an ultimatum upon
Midgett which, of necessity, deprived him of his constitutional right to testify on his own behalf." Id.
In essence, the trial court was forcing upon the defendant a "Hobson's" choice because a criminal
defendant is entitled to all of his guaranteed rights and cannot be forced to barter one for another. Id.
(citing United States v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 120-21 (3d Cir. 1977)). See also Stephanie J. Frye,
Disclosure of Incriminating Physical Evidence Received from a Client: The Defense Attorney's
Dilemma, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 419, 442-43 (1981) (discussing the interaction between the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments); Robert P. Mosteller, Admissibility of Fruits of Breached Evidentiary Privi-
leges: The Importance ofAdversarial Fairness, Party Culpability, and Fear of Immunity, 81 WASH.
U. L.Q. 961, 989-1007 (2003) (describing in detail the evidentiary privileges created by the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments).
230. WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. cmt. 10 (2006); Zacharias & Green, supra note
57, at 4 n.13 (citing Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 63, 73-83 (1980)) (arguing for "a broader scope for engaged moral judgment in day-to-day
professional activities while encouraging a keener sense of personal responsibility for the conse-
quences of these activities.").
231. HAZARD & RHODE, supra note 39, at 137.
232. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, THE OPPORTUNITY IN THE LAW, IN BUSINESS: A PROFESSION 329
(Hale, Cushman & Flint 1933) (1914).
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poses of a legal regime," they should not use "every ingenuity of his or
her trade to resist or evade compliance. 2 33 After all, it seems wrong to
conceive of the law and the state wholly as adversaries because we are,
after all, members of a common political community, with agreed-upon
procedures for establishing and changing its common frameworks.
234
B. The Clash of Loyalties
Ideally, the Rules of Professional Conduct should strike a manage-
able balance between the ethical imperatives mandating the promotion of
justice and zealous advocacy. Furthermore, it is absolutely imperative
that lawyers, who may potentially lose their license to practice if not
compliant with the rules, 2 35 receive guidelines that relieve as much of
that pressure as possible. For the most part, Washington's adopted rules
strike a good balance by allowing attorneys to choose when to reveal
client confidences in the most dire of circumstances under Rule 1.6, and
protecting those confidences in all other situations. 236 However, Wash-
ington should align Rules 1.6 and 3.3 more closely, and allow discretion-
ary disclosure of Rule 1.6 confidences to the court in circumstances of
client fraud and criminal conduct.
The pressure the 2006 Washington rule creates can be seen by look-
ing at a hypothetical situation based on the facts of Nix v. Whiteside,
where the U.S. Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant does not
have a constitutional right to perjure himself.237 There, the defendant and
two companions went to the victim's house seeking marijuana.23 8 The
victim was in bed when the defendant arrived, and the two began to ar-
gue. 239 The victim directed his girlfriend to get his gun, and at one point,
the victim got up and then returned to his bed. 240 The defendant testified
that he saw the victim reach under his pillow; thinking the victim was
reaching for a gun, the defendant consequently stabbed him. 241 The de-
fendant told his attorney that although he did not see a gun, he was con-
vinced that the victim had been reaching for one.242
Now suppose the attorney, not having any reason to suspect a false-
hood, prepares the case based on that version of events. At trial, the de-
233. Gordon, supra note 21, at 48 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000).
234. See id. at 42, 47-48.
235. WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. cnt. 19 (2006).
236. See id. at R. 1.6.
237. 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
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fendant takes the stand and tells a slightly different version of events:
that he had seen something "metallic" in the victim's hand.243 The attor-
ney is now faced with a difficult problem: under adopted Rule 3.3, if the
attorney knows that the client has engaged in perjury, then he has a duty
to remedy the situation. 244 Since the attorney is already at the trial stage
of the case, it is unlikely that the judge would allow withdrawal.245 If the
attorney decides that the only true remedy is disclosure to the court, the
attorney had better be completely sure that his client truly has engaged in
perjury, because disclosure by the attorney of his belief that his client has
committed perjury would expose his client to a range of negative conse-
quences, whether the client is factually guilty or not.246 Also, the attorney
must be confident that any disclosure is not prohibited by Rule 1.6. If
disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6,247 the only option is for the attorney
to seek to withdraw or plead with the client to rectify the situation.248
The ultimate tension between the two conflicting duties will be
placed squarely on criminal defense lawyers, as the above example
shows, because criminal defendants have a constitutional right to tes-
tify.249 The Court in Nix v. Whiteside decided that even though a criminal
243. Id. at 161. The actual facts of Nix v. Whiteside are slightly different. In Nix, the defendant
changed his story about a week before trial and said he saw something metallic in the victim's hand.
Id. Defense counsel informed the defendant that if he testified falsely it would be perjury, and he
would have to withdraw from representation and advise the Court of the perjury. Id. The defendant
eventually testified that he had not seen the gun. Id. The Court concluded that defense counsel's
insistence on truth did not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights to assistance of counsel:
"Whatever the scope of a constitutional right to testify, it is elementary that such a right does not
extend to testifying falsely." Id. at 173.
244. WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(2) (2006). A lawyer may not fail to disclose
a material fact when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting in criminal or fraudulent conduct,
unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6. Id. Arguably, in this situation a lawyer would be assist-
ing in perjury if he did not disclose this material fact to the tribunal. See id. at R. 1.2(d) ("A lawyer
shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent").
245. E.g., State v. McDowell, 272 Wis. 2d 488, 496-97 (2004) (the judge refused to let the
attorney withdraw because trial was already underway).
246. WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 11 (2006).
247. Disclosure in this instance would most likely be prohibited by Rule 1.6. Under this factual
scenario, none of the 1.6 exemptions seem to apply. See id. at R. 1.6. For example, revelation of
confidential information in this situation would not "prevent the client from committing a crime"
because the client has already committed the crime. Id. at R. 1.6(b)(2). Also, there is no substantial
financial property interest at stake. Id. at R. 1.6(b)(3).
248. Id. at 3.3(d).
249. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 164 (1986) (finding that "[a]lthough this Court has never
explicitly held that a criminal defendant has a due process right to testify in his own behalf, cases in
several Circuits have held so, and the right has long been assumed"); see also State v. Robinson, 138
Wash. 2d 753, 758, 982 P.2d 590, 594 (1999) (holding that a criminal defendant has both a state and
a constitutional right to testify on his or her own behalf). However, the 2006 Washington RPC do
not explicitly protect the criminal defendant's right to testify. See supra notes 193-99 and accompa-
nying text.
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defendant has the right to testify, that same defendant does not have the
right to lie.250 The Court acknowledged the tension that exists in placing
a criminal defendant on the stand while knowing or having reasonable
certainty that the defendant is going to falsely testify, but did not recom-
mend what an attorney must or should do in that situation.2 5 1 Thus, a de-
fense attorney must put his or her client on the stand when the client in-
sists on testifying, even if the attorney knows the client will commit per-
jury. Then, as soon as the client is done testifying, the attorney may turn
to the judge and say, "Excuse me, your honor, but I need to withdraw."
This turn of events would be an unacceptable situation in which to
place both the attorney and client.252 Overall, the tension placed on law-
yers by Washington's new rule is too great-rules of conduct should
help guide lawyers in making ethically correct decisions rather than force
lawyers to choose between violating their professional code and violating
their clients' trust.
That is not to say that Washington should mandate Rule 1.6 disclo-
sures as recommended by the Ethics 2003 Committee.253 At least one
state that experimented with a strict candor rule has recently retreated
from its extreme position because lawyers found that the rule destroyed
whatever confidentiality existed between lawyer and client.254 New Jer-
sey adopted a radical candor rule which required that a lawyer not "fail
to disclose to the tribunal a material fact with knowledge that the tribunal
may tend to be misled by such failure." 255 This rule effectively made an
attorney responsible for a misapprehension on the part of the tribunal that
the attorney could have prevented.256 However, the Supreme Court of
New Jersey rarely enforced the extreme rule,257 and in 2003 that court
250. Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 173 ("Whatever the scope of a constitutional right to testify, it is
elementary that such a right does not extend to testifying falsely.").
251. Seeid. at 176-77.
252. The attorney may inform the client, and indeed should inform the client, that the attorney
is obligated to remedy the situation if the client lies while on the stand. This may induce the client to
testify truthfully. Or, it may induce the client to be untruthful with the lawyer from the beginning
because the client knows the lawyer will not risk professional sanctions should the client change his
testimony; a truly unfortunate outcome, considering the importance of truthful communication be-
tween a lawyer and client. See discussion infra notes 261-67. Of course, an effective system should
provide plaintiffs, defendants, and witnesses with incentives to present truthful evidence. However,
an effective system should not punish the lawyer if the individual client chooses not to present truth-
ful evidence. Instead, the lawyer should be encouraged and supported in taking steps to prevent and
remedy untruthfulness to the court, rather than sanctioned for the conscious and sometimes uncon-
trollable choice of another. A criminal defense lawyer has no choice but to let his client testify.
253. See WSBA REPORT, supra note 4, app. D, at 7-9.
254. Walfish, supra note 64, at 642.
255. Id. at 638.
256. Id. at 639.
257. Id. at 644 (in over twenty years the rule has only been mentioned in thirty-five published
decisions).
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adopted a weaker rule in response to public criticism and dissatisfac-
tion. 8 Critics of both the old and the new rule argue that either version
places tension on the attorney-client relationship. 259 The New Jersey Bar
Association recommended deleting the rule altogether, stating, "[T]he
rule strains the attorney-client relationship by placing a duty on a lawyer
to disclose information that may be adverse to the client's interest.
' 260
Another reason why a mandatory disclosure rule may be problem-
atic is because it erodes the attorney-client relationship and attorney-
client privilege. Although little empirical evidence exists on this sub-
ject,26 1 it is a general premise that the attorney-client privilege encour-
ages full communication between clients and attorneys. 62 Indeed, the
Court in Upjohn Co. v. United States263 declared that clients "must be
able to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discus-
sions will be protected. 264 As former Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote,
"[a]n uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results
in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privi-
lege at all. 265
Under a mandatory disclosure version of Rule 3.3, clients will be
afraid of revealing, and lawyers will be afraid of hearing, factual guilt.
The most concerning situation would be where the client, having been
258. Id. at 639 (although a lawyer's duty is still triggered if the omission is reasonably certain
to mislead, the rule does not require disclosure if that disclosure would violate a privilege or other
law).
259. Id. at 643.
260. Id. For another article discussing New Jersey's rule and describing the negative conse-
quences of expanding the duty of candor, see Richard Silverman, Note, Is New Jersey's Heightened
Duty of Candor Too Much of a Good Thing?, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 951, 959-61 (2006).
261. See generally Note, A ttorney-Client and Work Product Protection in a Utilitarian World:
An Argument for Recomparison, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1697, 1700 n.32 (1995). There are at least four
published studies exploring the relationship between the typical layperson's, client's, and business
executive's expectations of confidentiality and willingness to disclose secrets to the attorney. Id.
Most interestingly, in every survey the majority of those interviewed indicated, in some way, that
they would withhold information from their lawyer if the lawyer could not guarantee confidentiality
but would generally keep information secret. Id. For another discussion of three of the surveys and
conclusions drawn from those surveys see Edward J. lmwinkelried, Questioning the Behavioral
Assumption Underlying Wigmorean Absolutism in the Law of Evidentiary Privileges, 65 U. PITT L.
REV. 145, 157 (2004).
262. This article does not explore the validity of this assumption. However, some commenta-
tors have attacked the premise that a confidentiality privilege will encourage client truthfulness. See
generally lmwinkelried, supra note 261. Washington seems to officially embrace the assumption.
See WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2006) ("This [principle of non-disclosure]
contributes to the trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship. The client is thereby
encouraged to seek legal assistance and to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to
embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter.").
263. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
264. Id. at 393.
265. Id. at 392.
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assured by the attorney that most communications are kept confidential,
relays information with the expectation that the information will be pro-
tected. Moreover, if the client confidence must be revealed because a
testifying witness commits perjury, the sense of betrayal that client
probably would feel would likely be devastating to the attorney-client
relationship. 266 The comments to the proposed RPC do recognize the po-
tential for this situation, but hold that "the alternative is that the lawyer
cooperate in deceiving the court, thereby subverting the truth-finding
process which the adversary system is designed to implement." 2
67
But the assumption that an attorney will subvert the truth-finding
process which the adversary system is designed to implement is ques-
tionable. The adversary system as a truth-finding process is not a straight
shot to the truth; rather, it is a process in which opposing sides vigor-
ously compete to convince a neutral fact-finder that their version is cor-
rect. 268 When attorneys reveal client confidences, they are undermining
the adversarial system by becoming fact finders themselves.269 If the rule
obliging the lawyer to reveal client confidences continues to expand, the
266. WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 11 (2006).
267. Id. The disclosure of a client's false testimony can result in grave consequences to the
client, including not only a sense of betrayal but also loss of the case and perhaps a prosecution for
perjury. But the alternative is that the lawyer cooperate in deceiving the court, thereby subverting the
truth-finding process which the adversary system is designed to implement. See Rule 1.2(d). Fur-
thermore, unless it is clearly understood that the lawyer will act upon the duty to disclose the exis-
tence of false evidence, the client can simply reject the lawyer's advice to reveal the false evidence
and insist that the lawyer keep silent. Thus the client could in effect coerce the lawyer into being a
party to fraud on the court. Id.
268. Peter J. Henning, Lawyers, Truth, and Honesty in Representing Clients, 20 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 209, 212-15 (2006). The author notes that it is difficult to say that a trial
"accurately reflects the truth about what occurred ... [because] a trial is not [like] a quiz show with
the right answer waiting in a sealed envelope." Id. at 212. Thus, references to "truth" tend to obfus-
cate rather than clarify an attorney's role. Id. The core of the attorney-client relationship is trust,
which is protected by the attorney-client privilege that mostly prevents the attorney from being com-
pelled to disclose client secrets. Id. And, that privilege frustrates the search for "truth" because the
lawyer "ordinarily may not reveal what has been learned during the representation of the client." Id.
Ultimately, then, dedication to the truth cannot be a lawyer's paramount goal when every lawyer is
equally compelled to keep the truth hidden. Id. "Finding the truth is the object of the judicial system,
but it is not the governing principal for the lawyer." Id. at 214.
269. Rhode, supra note 213, at 197 ("Our system proceeds on the assumption that guilt is best
determined 'not in the privacy of one lawyer's office but in open court under due process'."). If one
party uses deception the fact finder may indeed be frustrated in its ability to award a just remedy.
When and if discovered, the party who commits perjury should naturally be subjected to appropriate
legal sanctions. But, client or witness perjury should not necessarily lead to attorney sanctions
should the attorney not authorize or encourage the perjury. A bright line should be drawn between
attorneys who help their clients commit fraud or perjury and attorneys who do their best to prevent
materially false evidence from being presented to the court. Ultimately, we should not sanction
attorneys who make every effort to prevent false evidence from being presented, but their client or
witness nevertheless testifies falsely, and the attorney is unwilling to reveal client confidences to
remedy the situation.
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system will no longer follow the spirit of the adversary system, and in-
stead it will begin to resemble a system where counsels' job is not to
zealously advocate on behalf of their client, but to gather facts impar-
tially and present those to the court.2 70 This rule removes attorneys from
the role of trusted advisor and advocate, and replaces them with a court-
room investigator.27' As Justice Frankfurter explained, "[o]urs is the ac-
cusatorial as opposed to the inquisitorial system .... Under our system,
society carries the burden of proving its charge against the accused not
out of his own mouth. 272 A basic premise of the adversarial system is
that the truth will emerge after full and vigorous representation.273 If that
basic premise is taken as true, lawyers who do not deem it best to reveal
client confidences, after balancing the interests of society with the inter-
ests of their client, are not subverting truth, but are merely serving as
zealous advocates because it is society's burden to prove factual guilt,
not the lawyer's.
274
Overall, a mandatory disclosure rule, such as Model Rule 3.3,
would be more harmful than helpful. As proof, when New Jersey's strict
candor rule was in place, it was ineffective because New Jersey courts
would not enforce it and attorneys felt it harmed the attorney-client rela-
tionship.275 Hence, a better rule for all interested parties would be a bal-
anced rule that allowed an attorney the discretion to reveal client confi-
dences when the attorney felt absolutely compelled that in the particular
situation justice required such action.
V. A PUSH FOR CHANGE-A DIFFERENT TAKE ON
THE DUTY OF CANDOR
The purpose of this Part is to propose a slightly different rule to
govern candor to the tribunal ("alternative rule"). Similar to adopted
Rule 3.3, this alternative rule forbids the lawyer from lying to the court,
270. This would resemble a European inquisitorial or Napoleonic system. For a discussion of
the inquisitorial system, see Martin Killias et al., Crime and Punishment in Switzerland, 1985-1999,
33 CRIME & JUSTICE 213, 216-17 (2005). For a discussion of the "Napoleonic" system see Edward
A. Tomlinson, Nonadversarial Justice: The French Experience, 42 MD. L. REV. 131, 134-135
(1983).
271. For an argument that attorneys and courts are wrong to think of our legal system as purely
adversarial see generally Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due
Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1184
(2005), who argues that our legal system only became fully adversarial in the last half century.
Kessler urges that we uncover our forgotten, quasi-inquisitorial equity tradition in order to facilitate
an inquisitorial procedural reform. Id. at 1185.
272. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949).
273. FREEDMAN, supra note 98, at 9.
274. See supra note 268.
275. See supra note 254-60 and accompanying text.
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presenting material evidence known by the lawyer to be false, or encour-
aging a client to commit perjury. The alternative rule is just as strict as
adopted Rule 3.3 on attorney perjury and misrepresentations, but allows
the attorney more discretion in deciding when to reveal client confi-
dences to remedy a client's fraud or crime. The alternative rule, with ma-
jor changes noted, is as follows:
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail
to correct a false statement of material fact or law previ-
ously made to the tribunal by the lawyer;
(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclo-
sure is necessary to avoid assisting in a criminal or fraudu-
lent act by the client, unless such disclosure is prohibited
by Rule 1.6, in which case the lawyer may make the disclo-
sure if the lawyer deems that the interests of justice so de-
mand;
(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false;
(b) The duties stated in paragraph (a) continue to the conclusion of
the proceeding.
(c) If the lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know
of its falsity, the lawyer shall promptly disclose this fact to the tri-
bunal unless such disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6, in which
case the lawyer may make the disclosure if the lawyer deems that
the interests of iustice so demand.
(d) If the lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know
of its falsity, and disclosure of this fact is prohibited by Rule 1.6,
the lawyer shall promptly make reasonable efforts to convince the
client to consent to disclosure. If the client refuses to consent to dis-
closure, the lawyer may seek to withdraw from representation in ac-
cordance with Rule 1.16 or may make the disclosure if, after weigh-
ing the interests of the client with the interests of the tribunal, the
lawyer determines that disclosure is the proper remedy.
(e) A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than the testimony
of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably be-
lieves is false.
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(f) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of
all material facts known to the lawyer that will enable the tribunal to
make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.
The alternative rule closely tracks Washington's 2006 Rule 3.3.
Like Washington's 2006 Rule 3.3 and 2003 Model Rule 3.3, the alterna-
tive rule would discourage attorneys from conduct that is evasive (that is,
conduct that betrays a willingness to consume court resources when the
information is not even subject to the protection of Rule 1.6).276 The al-
ternative rule would subject attorneys to professional sanctions for mis-
leading the court and opposing counsel by concealing critical but discov-
erable information. In essence, the alternative rule would function just as
well as the adopted rule in this regard.
However, the alternative rule, unlike Washington's 2006 Rule, nei-
ther prohibits nor forces attorneys to reveal client confidences. Instead,
attorneys are encouraged to take any and all remedial actions that are
necessary. This includes encouraging the client to be truthful, threatening
to withdraw if the client insists on perjury, or refusing to aid the client in
any way in perjuring himself. If the attorney feels that under the particu-
lar facts disclosure is necessary to promote justice, then under the alter-
native rule the attorney may reveal client information and would be sup-
ported in doing so. Additionally, opposing counsel would still have the
opportunity to impeach the client and bring criminal perjury charges
even if the client's attorney chose not to reveal confidences.
The alternative rule adopts the Model Rule's version of constitu-
tional protection 277 for criminal defendants. Washington 2006 RPC Rule
3.3 does not appear to offer adequate protection for criminal defense at-
torneys.278 Nothing is said in Washington's adopted rule about a criminal
defendant's special rights; only the comments mention how the rule deals
with a defendant's constitutional rights, and even then somewhat
vaguely. 279 The alternative rule solves this by using language from
276. For example, when a lawyer fails to reveal to the court that his client has died, the lawyer
will be disciplined. The information is plainly discoverable, but would materially affect the disposi-
tion of the case. Another example is where the lawyer fails to inform opposing counsel and the court
that his client is bankrupt. See Kernan v. One Wash. Park Urban Renewal Ass'n, 713 A.2d 411 (N.J.
Sup. Ct. 1998).
277. See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 193-99 and accompanying text.
279. WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 7 (2006) ("The duties stated in paragraph
(a) apply to all lawyers, including defense counsel in criminal cases. In some jurisdictions other than
Washington, however, courts have required counsel to present the accused as a witness or to give a
narrative statement if the accused so desires, even if counsel knows that the testimony or statement
will be false. The obligation of the advocate under the Rules of Professional Conduct is subordinate
to such requirements. See State v. Berrysmith, 87 Wash. App. 268, 944 P.2d 397 (1997), review
denied, 134 Wash. 2d 1008, 954 P.2d 277 (1998).").
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Model Rule 3.3(a)(3) to clarify that criminal defendants have the right to
testify and that a lawyer must not inhibit that right.
Overall, the alternative rule takes the middle track. It allows the at-
torney to reveal client confidences in extreme circumstances, as Model
Rule 3.3 contemplates, and in all other situations it encourages lawyers
to protect client confidences, as Washington 2006 Rule 3.3 contemplates.
In essence, the rule allows the attorney the discretion to decide the best
course of action after balancing the client's interest in having an advo-
cate with whom the client can openly communicate and the court's inter-
ests in maintaining integrity and truthfulness in proceedings.
VI. CONCLUSION
In formulating a different rule, one must be careful not to go too far
in requiring the attorney to take on the role of both an advocate and a
guardian of opposing counsel's case. Frankel argued the following:
The object of a lawsuit is to get at the truth and arrive at the right
result. That is the sole objective of the judge, and counsel should
never lose sight of that objective in thinking that the end purpose
is to win for his side. Counsel exclusively bent on winning may
find that he and the umpire are not in the same game.2 s °
But, in keeping with the analogy, a coach, watching his ballplayer
running for home base, would never turn to the umpire and say, "by the
way, you called that wrong, he was out, not safe." It is the umpire's duty,
as the fact finder or the neutral mediator, to call the strikes and balls as
he sees them. Likewise, it is the coach's duty to keep his ballplayers in
line by explaining the rules and giving them advice on the best strategy
for making it to home plate. The game would no longer be baseball if the
coach was required to turn his players in every time they were really out
and the umpire called them safe. And it would no longer be baseball if
the coach was forced to turn a blind eye to his player's behavior and did
not have the power to keep them in line by putting a player on the bench.
Unfortunately, generations of legal scholars have struggled to find
the perfect balance between a lawyer's duty as a private advocate and a
public servant. In most respects, Washington's rules find the right bal-
ance in protecting the attorney-client privilege and protecting the integ-
rity of the court. However, Washington's adopted Rules 3.3 and 1.6, and
the ABA Model Rules 3.3 and 1.6, miss the mark. The Model Rules go
beyond what is necessary to preserve court integrity and provides little
support to practicing attorneys. Washington's adopted rules do not pro-
280. Frankel, supra note 76, at 1035.
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vide enough discretion to attorneys who wish to uphold the integrity of
the court. Thus, an alternative rule that makes disclosures discretionary
but still encourages and protects lawyers who take remedial actions
would be a preferable rule.
